R (on the application of LMN and another) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Respondent)

Permission to Appeal application lodged

Case summary
Permission to Appeal
Previous proceedings

Case summary

Case ID

UKSC/2026/0107

Parties

Appellant(s)

LMN and EFG

Respondent(s)

Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

Issue

Was the non-consensually conceived exception to the two-child limit on the ‘child element’ of Universal Credit (“UC”) unlawfully discriminatory on the basis that: (i) it contained differential ordering provisions for the non-consensually conceived and non-parental exceptions; and (ii) it made no special provision in respect of third or later (consensually conceived) children born to mothers of non-consensually conceived children?

Facts

UC has a ‘child element’, paid by the Respondent to parents responsible for eligible dependent children. Between April 2017 and April 2026, the child element was capped at two dependent children (the “two-child limit”). The two-child limit was subject to exceptions, one of which was for children who were not consensually conceived (the “NCC exception”). The NCC exception meant that, if a third or subsequent child was not conceived consensually, the two-child limit would not be applied to that child. The Appellants, LMN and EFG, are mothers of more than two children. Some of those children were not conceived consensually because of violent relationship abuse LMN and EFG suffered. The Appellants applied to the Respondent for the child element of UC in relation to their children who were third or later children and were – at the relevant time – recorded as being consensually conceived. The Respondent rejected these applications because, as consensually conceived children, the NCC exception was inapplicable. The Appellants consequently sought judicial review of the ‘third or subsequent’ element of the NCC exception, contained in Regulations 24A and 24B of the Universal Credit Regulations (the “2013 Regulations”). This was on several bases, including the ground which is the subject of the appeal to the Supreme Court: the 2013 Regulations were discriminatory, contrary to Article 14 (read with Article 8 or Article 1 of the First Protocol) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In July 2025, the Administrative Court of the High Court dismissed the Appellants’ claim. In July 2026, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellants’ appeal. LMN and EFG now appeal to the Supreme Court.