Y (Appellant) v Glasgow City Council (Respondent)

Case summary

Case ID

UKSC/2026/0064

Parties

Appellant(s)

Y

Respondent(s)

Glasgow City Council

Issue

Did Glasgow City Council breach its statutory duty to secure permanent accommodation for the applicant within a reasonable period of time?

Facts

Under the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 (“the 1987 Act”), Glasgow City Council (“the Council”) owe duties to secure accommodation for individuals who are homeless. The petitioner, (known in the proceedings below as Y), applied to the Council in 2019 for assistance obtaining accommodation as a homeless person under the 1987 Act. The Council accepted that Y was homeless, that it owed her a duty to provide her with permanent accommodation under s31, and that it owed her a duty to provide her with interim accommodation under s29 pending suitable permanent accommodation becoming available. Initially, Y was housed in a one-bedroom flat. Her family then joined her from Sudan. The whole family - Y, her husband, two sons, three daughters and niece - were then housed in a three-bedroom flat as interim accommodation. The family were initially content to remain in the property as interim accommodation, but Y’s health and mobility deteriorated, she became mainly housebound, and the property became unsuitable. The Council made two offers of alternative interim accommodation in October and December 2023. Both offers comprised of two separate flats within the same building, but the Council considered that the family would still be able to live as a family in a practical sense. Y refused both offers. Y sought a declarator that the Council had failed to comply with its statutory duties to provide her with interim and permanent accommodation under the 1987 Act. She also asked the court to order the respondent to make permanent accommodation available to her. In the Outer House, the Lord Ordinary found that the Council had breached its statutory duties to Y. She found that, after the deterioration in Y’s health and mobility, the decision to continue to house Y and her family in the interim accommodation was no longer reasonable. Furthermore, the two offers of accommodation which were refused by Y were not suitable offers of alternative interim accommodation, because they would still be overcrowded and would not allow the family to live together in a practical sense. In the circumstances, the Lord Ordinary found that the time elapsed without providing permanent accommodation was not reasonable. She made a mandatory order, ordering the Council comply with its statutory duties by securing permanent accommodation for Y and her family. The Council appealed to the Inner House. Before the appeal was heard, the Council offered a secure tenancy to Y as permanent accommodation, which she accepted. The Second Division nonetheless proceeded to hear and decide the appeal, due to the public interest in clarifying the duties of local authorities in future cases. The Second Division allowed the Council’s appeal, finding that the offers of alternative interim accommodation were suitable and that the Council was not in breach of its duties to Y. Y now appeals to the Supreme Court.

Date of issue

21 May 2026

Case origin

PTA

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