BDB Pitmans LLP (now known as Broadfield Law UK LLP) and another (Respondents) v Lee and another (Appellants)

Case summary

Case ID

UKSC/2026/0021

Parties

Appellant(s)

(1) Mark William Lee (2) Kenilworth Claim Limited (In Liquidation)

Respondent(s)

(1) BDB Pitmans LLP (now known as Broadfield Law UK LLP) (2) Adcamp LLP (formerly known as Pitmans LLP)

Issue

Should the court order substitution under the Civil Procedure Rules r19.6(3)(a) due to a mistake made by the claimants in naming the defendant, where the alleged negligent party had merged with the named defendant?

Facts

This appeal concerns the correct interpretation of one of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) relating to limitation periods. A limitation period is the legally defined time frame within which legal proceedings must be commenced for a particular claim. After the limitation period elapses, the claim may be barred. CPR r19.6(3)(b) empowers the court to add or substitute a party after the expiration of a relevant limitation period where it is necessary to do so because “the claim cannot properly be carried on by or against the original party unless the new party is added or substituted as a claimant or defendant”. The underlying substantive claim is a claim for damages for professional negligence. The claimants were the registered proprietors of two properties near to the Ascot Racecourse, known as Elizabeth House and Kenilworth House. Pitmans LLP (“Pitmans”, the second respondent) acted on behalf of the claimants in connection with the sale of their properties for development purposes. The claimants allege that Pitmans did so negligently, causing loss to the claimants in the order of £20 million. After the alleged negligence, Pitmans transferred its business to a firm then known as Bircham Dyson Bell LLP (a “merger”). This firm was renamed BDB Pitmans LLP and later changed its name again to its present name, Broadfield Law UK LLP (“Broadfield”, the first respondent). Shortly before the expiry of the limitation period, the claimants sued Broadfield for the negligence of Pitmans following the merger between the two entities. The claimants did so, it is alleged, on the basis of representations made by Broadfield in its published accounts and correspondence to the effect that it was the liable party. After the limitation period for a claim against Pitmans expired, Broadfield applied to strike out the claim or for a reverse summary judgment (a decision in their favour made without a trial), contending that there was no arguable basis that Broadfield could be liable to the claimants for Pitmans’ alleged negligence (“Broadfield’s Application”). The claimants responded by amending their claim to set out the detail of their case. They also applied contingently to substitute Pitmans for Broadfield, i.e. if Broadfield’s case on liability were right (the “Substitution Application”). By an order dated 7 November 2025, the judge dismissed Broadfield’s Application and made an interim declaration on the Substitution Application. She also granted Broadfield permission to appeal. Broadfield’s appeal was heard in a consolidated hearing with a legally-related appeal, Office Properties PL Ltd (in liquidation) v Adcamp LLP [2025] EWHC 170 (Ch). By an order dated 10 February 2026, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal (dismissing the claimants’ contingent Substitution Application) and granted the claimants permission to appeal. The claimants accordingly appeal to the Supreme Court. They seek that the Supreme Court order that Pitmans be substituted for Broadfield, or (depending on the basis of its decision) make an interim declaration that the Court has power to order substitution in the event the claims were to fail due to the identification of the defendant.

Date of issue

24 February 2026

Case origin

Appeal As of Right

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